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abstract – D2 
 
The invasion of Iraq on 19 March, 2003 by U.S. military forces was predicated on two primary 
“causus belli,” 1) that the government of Saddam Hussein was pursuing active WMD programs 
on several fronts, including nuclear and biological, and 2) that he had some secret alliance with 
Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden.  Both of these claims were proven to be false, but only after a 
country that had not attacked the United States was devastated, its government destroyed, about 
100,000 of its citizens killed in the first year and a long aftermath of civil violence unleashed that 
has not ended 12 years later.  The financial cost to the USA is over $1 trillion, including health 
care for our wounded.  The cost to our international reputation may be greater in the long run.  
 
After extensive searches of the country finding no WMDs of any consequence, policy people 
blamed the American Intelligence Community (IC) for shoddy work, while intelligence insiders 
tended to blame the policy side for insisting on evidence to support what they desired instead of 
reality.  Rank “politicization” of intelligence was revealed when the head of Britain’s MI6 
(foreign intelligence) Sir Richard Dearlove reported to his Prime Minister, Tony Blair on 23 July, 
2002 that “the intelligence was being fixed around the policy.”  That is a concise definition of 
politicization, which is a cardinal sin among responsible intelligence analysts. 
 
Several analysts from several US agencies objected to how intelligence assessments were being 
skewed to sell this war. Many suffered bad consequences for their objections, and at least one had 
her career destroyed even though Valerie Plame Wilson had not said anything in public about her 
concerns about factual accuracy.  Her husband did write something in the New York Times about 
Niger, where he had once been US Ambassador.i  Enraged by some truth in print that contradicted 
the official story in play, some of the men who had distorted intelligence to start with decided to 
retaliate by exposing her (Plame’s) career in the National Clandestine Service of the CIA working 
on nuclear non-proliferation, thus putting at real risk her own family and every non-American 
source she had cultivated over two decades of work.  US and global security were also wounded. 
 
Everyone involved was a human being, from analysts, Vice Presidents and Undersecretaries of 
Defense, to soldiers, agents, and sources in the field, to thousands of children blown to bits or 
orphaned by this arguably illegal and immoral war.  This paper will focus on how that affected 
intelligence agents and agencies involved.  System level effects on HUMINT operators, sources 
and networks will be discussed.  The role of an “Office of Special Plans” will be detailed, which 
was created in the Pentagon to bypass quality controls at the CIA and elsewhere in the US-IC.  
Basically politicians mandated reliance on unvetted and extremely unreliable single sources like 
“Curveball” in Germany, even after warnings from Germany’s BND.  Finally, some comparisons 
will be made with the failure of early warning in Israel prior to the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  In 
that case Mossad (foreign) and Aman (military intelligence) analysts were blinking red alerts, but 
the politicians could not believe that attack was coming due to group-think and related problems. 
                                                          
1 This was how Great Britain’s Head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, described politicization in Washington D.C. when 
he reported to his Prime Minister’s Cabinet on 23 July, 2002.  The decision to invade Iraq had been made long 
before.  Now the Bush Administration was ‘fixing facts’ to sell this to the US Congress, and they hoped to the UN. 
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The Office of Special Plans 
 
The Office of Special Plans (hereafter OSP) was just the most important node of a network of 
intelligence entities created by a cabal of what some call “neoconservatives” or “neocons” who 
were already devoted to invading Iraq again as soon as their plan could be sold to enough U.S. 
Congressmen and they hoped, to the United Nations.  This OSP was created by Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, who reported to Deputy Director Paul Wolfowitz, who reported 
to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who reported in theory to President George Bush but 
more accurately to the Darth Vader of this story, Vice President Dick Cheney.  All of these people 
can be shown to have supported a second invasion of Iraq within days or weeks after 9/11/2001 
(the first US war with Iraq started in 1991 after Iraq invaded Kuwait).  Vice Presidents cannot 
order America to war, so some serious rationale backed by evidence would be necessary to sell 
this war to Congress, the American people, and they hoped to the United Nations. ii, iii 
 
In their minds, the OSP was tasked just to review raw Iraq intelligence coming into the IC to find 
nuggets of information that might have been overlooked initially, especially regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMDs).  In the minds of objective observers like Sir. Richard Dearlove, 
head of Britain’s MI6, and many people at the CIA and State Department, this Pentagon office 
was really designed to bypass the normal, interagency review process that exists to prevent errors 
of fact or analysis from appearing on the President’s desk or in formal, “finished intelligence” 
products like an NIE. iv  A “backdoor” had been created to funnel unchecked intelligence 
allegations directly to President George W. Bush via his gatekeeper and minder, Dick Cheney. 
 
Professional analysts call this logically flawed process “cherry picking” where a large mass of all-
source information is culled to find nuggets that support a predetermined conclusion or policy 
position.  If analysts or an analytic institution accepts any evidence that supports a position, and 
rejects any evidence that contradicts that position, it is tragically easy for people to convince 
themselves of almost anything, which is why the interagency review process was established. 
 
After invading Iraq on 19 March, 2003, destroying its government and many over 100,000 of its 
people, no WMDs of any consequence were found, nor any evidence of collusion between 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, or Iraq and Al Qaeda.  This prompted inquiries in the 
U.S. and Britain, some of which like the Chilcot Report, while finished in 2011, have not yet been 
made public, allegedly because the American IC wants this report to remain secret forever. v  The 
Independent newspaper of London reported this about the Chilcot Report on 7 April, 2013: 
“Hitherto unseen evidence given to the Chilcot Inquiry by British intelligence has revealed that former 
Prime Minister Tony Blair was told that Iraq had, at most, only a trivial amount of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and that Libya was in this respect a far greater threat. 
Intelligence officers have disclosed that just the day before Mr. Blair went to visit president George Bush 
in April 2002, he appeared to accept this but returned a "changed man" and subsequently ordered the 
production of dossiers to "find the intelligence" that he wanted to use to justify going to war.” 
The most relevant US Senate reports were published in July, 2004 and May, 2007 vi  When the 
OSP was created, many of the professional analysts in the original staff left because the political 
pressure to create distorted conclusions was so strong and so completely unprofessional (CIA 
analysis in particular are trained to “speak truth to power” without fear or favor, but they were 
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often excluded from this office, and DIA officers who objected to politicization of intelligence 
were transferred or pressured out).  One of the best public sources on the politicization of this 
office was an Air Force intelligence officer who did not leave, but stayed in despite her growing 
dismay at the fundamentally improper and unprofessional processes she witnessed. 
 
Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski wrote extensively about this after the fact when she 
retired.  She observed, for example, that:  “I witnessed neoconservative agenda bearers within the 
OSP usurp measured and carefully considered assessments, and through suppression and 
distortion of intelligence analysis promulgate what were in fact falsehoods to both Congress and 
the executive office of the President.” vii 
 
A separate section will focus on how such practices affect actual intelligence professionals, but it 
bears highlighting here that when second rate political managers drive out first rate analysts, and 
replace them with 3rd or 4th rate hacks who will write whatever they are told to and find what they 
know the bosses want, any degree of intelligence catastrophe can follow including war crimes. 
 
The OSP was preceded by other shadowy groups discussed by yet another Senate Report after the 
fact. viii  Ringleaders in that effort included two people who were deeply involved in the Iran-
Contra scandal of the mid-1980’s.  They were Iranian expatriate arms dealer and spy Manucher 
Ghorbanifar, and US citizen Michael Ledeen who once worked for the US Department of Defense 
but was let go because of dual loyalties to another country and a habit of constantly pitching 
multi-million dollar proposals to run operations against Iran.  Ghorbanifar had been a former 
officer in SAVAK, the brutal intelligence arm of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s Iran, so he had good 
reasons to hate the current government of militant mullahs who deposed the Shah.  But the CIA 
had also issued a “burn notice” against Ghorbanifar in 1984, due to criminal acts in service to a 
third country.  Mr. Ledeen also had many connections in Italian intelligence circles and is a lead 
suspect in the question of “who forged a letter alleging yellowcake sales to Iraq?”  Whether 
Ledeen was indeed the forger, or whether he was involved in getting this letter to SISME (Italian 
intelligence) and then to America’s IC is far less important for this review than recognizing that 
SOMEONE forged the letter, and got it to the President of the United States eyes despite obvious 
and profound flaws.  That forger had a strong desire to start another war between the United 
States and Iraq.  Given how such things are accomplished, the forger almost had to be connected 
with some national intelligence entity also, not necessarily or even probably American.  
  
 
Curveball and Allegations of Biological Weapons 
 
Having cooked the intelligence books to support a war the White House had desired for years 
prior, the Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, was tasked to deliver a plea to the United 
Nations to join the crusade.  Powell calls that speech his darkest hour now, since almost every 
claim he made there turned out to be false, despite spending three days at CIA asking for evidence 
until that agency’s director George Tenet told him that the evidence was “slam dunk” solid.  But 
General Powell was not able to actually see most of the data or any key sources.  In fact several of 
those sources were never seen by any U.S. intelligence professional.  An example is “Curveball” 
who alleged that Iraq had built and deployed “mobile biological weapons factories.” 
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Curveball was an appropriate codename for an Iraqi citizen who had defected to Germany.  He 
alleged that he was a former chemical engineer (probably true) but tried to trade exotic secrets for 
money and privileges.  The BND (German foreign intelligence) concluded that he was a “drunken 
fabricator” and put out a “don’t trust this guy” warning (burn notice) that went directly to CIA 
and other US intelligence entities.  Such warnings are common among intelligence agencies 
because they deal with many seamy people with hidden agendas and large appetites for money.  
Despite this warning, the unconfirmed allegation was passed through the back door provided by 
the OSP directly to President Bush without any corroboration of any kind, and despite 180 degree 
contradictions of prior testimony from people who actually had worked on Iraq’s early biological 
weapons programs, like their director, Iraqi General Hussein Kamel al-Majid who defected to 
Jordan in 1995. The General claimed, and provided evidence that such programs had been 
dismantled after the 1991 Gulf War and resulting inspections by the UN. 
 
Another CIA veteran, once Director of European Operations Tyler Drumheller, said that before 
the war one of Saddam Hussein’s own ministers (Foreign Minister Naji Sabri) had also confirmed 
to American intelligence that the Iraqis had not stockpiled weapons of mass destruction.  So Mr. 
Drumheller wrote a book (long after the war of course) and publicly asserted that President 
George W. Bush’s administration had knowingly hyped fabricated evidence of Iraq’s arsenal of 
biological weapons to justify the 2003 invasion. ix, x  True, but timing is essential in such things. 
 
In professional NIE’s (National Intelligence Estimates) cautions or “caveats” like the warning 
about Curveball from BND are usually included in footnotes at least, but no such nuances reached 
the US President, as intended by the cabal that manipulated him.  There were other examples, like 
an allegation that aluminum tubes had been purchased by the regime to make into centrifuges for 
refining uranium.  US Department of Energy specialists who actually design and make 
centrifuges said these looked nothing like what they use, but rather like blanks for artillery shells 
(which in the end, they proved to be).  But their reservations were also excluded from what the 
President or Congress saw during the efforts to sell this war.  As with Curveball, the original 
source was never even seen by U.S. intelligence, much less cross examined, but rather he was 
held by a foreign intelligence service not named in the Senate review reports to follow. 
 
But the most egregious manipulation of intelligence including felony crime committed against a 
true US intelligence professional who objected to allegations of yellowcake sales in Niger. 
 
 
Yellowcake in Niger, and a Fraudulent Letter Sold as Intelligence Gold 
 
Another allegation made by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN was that Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq had purchased tons of uranium “yellowcake” from Niger.  Yellowcake is a precursor form of 
uranium to be enriched to either run nuclear power plants or to create nuclear explosives.  Powell 
said that these claims were backed by “multiple sources” and “hard evidence.”  But in fact, the 
principle evidence for this was a letter given by someone to Italian intelligence (SISME) which 
passed it to the CIA.  The letter was in fact a crude forgery, almost instantly detected by skeptical 
minds at the United Nations, and by sceptics at the CIA who deal with misinformation, 
disinformation and political manipulations of information every day.  
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Their objections were suppressed by the Vice President’s information manipulators, but enough 
concern was generated at CIA to authorize a secret fact finding mission to Niger by a former US 
Ambassador to Niger, Joseph Wilson.  So he went to Africa, talked with his many government 
contacts there, and perhaps more cogently to officials of the French companies who actually 
mined the uranium and made the yellowcake.  They said the claim was ridiculous and that there 
was no way such a large amount of commercial product could just disappear from their records. 
 
So Joe Wilson wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, published on 6 July, 2003 titled “What I 
Didn’t Find in Africa.”  He laid out his evidence that the rumor of yellowcake sales to Iraq was 
false.  This enraged the information managers in the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney, who 
decided to retaliate in a novel way.  They did not engage the substance of Wilson’s essay.  Rather 
they revealed the identify of his wife, Valerie Plame Wilson, and her decades of work for the CIA 
on counter (WMD) proliferation issues to at least six reporters, one of whom published it (Robert 
Novak).  This put her entire family at risk, and even more, every source she had developed in 
numerous trips throughout the Middle East and beyond. Revealing identities of active intelligence 
officers at CIA in particular is a felony crime in the United States.  The FBI investigated up to and 
including interviews with VP Cheney and President Bush, but concluded that court ready 
evidence could only be produced to convict Cheney’s Chief of Staff, Irve L. “Scooter” Libby who 
was convicted of several crimes.  Libby’s sentence was promptly commuted by President Bush. xi 
 
This story is so egregious and un-American that Valerie Plame Wilson’s book about it “Fair 
Game” was turned into a successful Hollywood movie of the same name xii, xiii 
 
In this way the career of one US intelligence professional was destroyed because of her husband’s 
attempts to correct falsified intelligence of great consequence through democratic process. US 
security was gravely wounded and thousands of our troops were killed, but of course casualties 
and destruction of Iraq were much worse.  Other intelligence professionals notice when one is 
destroyed by their own administration.  Better people decide it’s time to leave.  They are replaced 
by people with less moral scruples or less ability to detect bullshit in the information stream, or 
both.  Liaison relationships even with close allies are also disturbed when they see that we won’t 
keep even the identities of our OWN clandestine agents secret, much less some other country’s.  
Sources overseas also dry up when they see other sources arrested and punished because our CIA 
or some other IC element sacrificed their anonymity to internal political squabbling.  
 
 
Torture, Renditions and other Bad Consequences, like Maybe One Million Dead,xiv a Nation 
Destroyed, and a Thousand Billion Dollars Poured into Desert Sand to Kill Them 
 
The most pernicious effect of politicizing national security intelligence to evade oversight or rule 
of law in general is the pervasive lawlessness that often results.  It is very difficult to keep torture 
contained, for example, once you have rationalized it for your ‘worst case’ scenarios.  Someone 
always wants ‘actionable intelligence’ bad enough to bend rules once it is clear that leadership 
approves.  And a handful of ‘high value’ detainees quickly becomes almost anyone you have 
imprisoned.  In Iraq, the US harvested grotesque scandals like the Abu Ghraib affair, xv and 
abductions of innocent people in allied countries like the Arar Maher case in Canada, the Khalid 
El-Masri case in Germany, and the Abu Omar case in Italy.  The first two ultimately got legal 
relief in their home countries after being kidnapped by CIA agents and tortured in third countries 
until our agents realized they were innocent.  El-Masri just had a name similar to another man.  
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Abu Omar is more complicated, because he was involved in some truly bad things, but rather than 
arrest and try him, he was kidnapped and tortured. Abducting Omar off an Italian street got 26 US 
CIA personnel indicted, and the chief of station had to flee to avoid arrest (Robert Seldon Lady).  
He cannot safely return to Europe now, a real consequence for him, and his name and face are 
known, ending his life of adventure as a spy. Several Italian SISME agents who helped them were 
convicted of felony crimes for doing so.  Who helps a foreign power abduct their own citizens?     
 
Intelligence analysts, assets and operators often work on the edges of legal conduct anyway, as 
their country defines that.  Breaking laws of other countries is routine.  They are, after all, SPIES.  
American intelligence officers already break serious laws of other countries over 100,000 times 
each year according to a Congressional study. xvi  But in theory, they are never supposed to break 
US laws, like the absolute prohibition on torture found in Title 18, Part 1 Chapter 113C of the 
U.S. Code, and in the UN Convention Against Torture which we ratified and largely wrote. xvii 
 
Having decided to invade and destroy a country that did not attack us, this cabal of aggressive 
neocons set out to reshape the entire Middle East.xviii  They decided to disregard international law 
entirely, and conducted an aggressive campaign to abduct alleged terrorists anywhere, and to 
“rendition” many to countries or “black sites” where they could be interrogated without restraints.  
Human Rights First reported that 98 of these prisoners died in custody, and that even the U.S. 
government considered 34 of these to be “probable homicides.” xix  One particularly egregious 
case involved a totally innocent taxi driver in Afghanistan, who was beaten to death trying to 
extract information he did not have.  That case is well described in the 2007 Academy Award 
Winning Documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side.” xx  Defenders of such conduct often distinguish 
between prisoners tortured by the Army, those tortured by the CIA or by its contractors, and those 
tortured in other countries where the CIA took them to be tortured.  Such hair-splitting employs 
many attorneys, but the net effect is pervasive and corrupting.  What difference does it make to a 
man who is tortured (or to his family) which unit, agency or country is doing such evils to him? 
 
After many reviews, President Barak Obama promised to end the rendition and torture programs 
in 2008.  Whether he actually did this or not is in great dispute.  He promised to close the special 
prison at Guantanamo, Cuba also where some torture techniques were refined, but this has not 
occurred. One system effect on intelligence employees is illumed by the fact that none of the CIA 
people who authorized, rationalized,xxi or committed the many abuses involved was ever indicted, 
prosecuted or sanctioned in any known way.xxii  A few very low level Army prison guards (a.k.a. 
privates and sergeants) were jailed for acts at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. But the only CIA person 
sanctioned was the one CIA employee who confirmed to a reporter that his agency was engaged 
in kidnapping and torturing people around the world xxiii (John Kiriakou served a 3 year sentence 
for revealing classified information and had his career, if not life destroyed).  The bureaucratic 
reality is that the people who get punished are the ones with rare moral courage who speak out 
about evil. Bureaucrats who do whatever power wants get well paid, and thugs employed to beat, 
waterboard, and occasionally kill prisoners get promoted, like Jose Rodriguez, Jr. who became 
Deputy Director of the CIA for its National Clandestine Service.  His memoir “Hard Choices” 
describes his reasons for destroying evidence about waterboarding in particular. xxiv 
 
Considering all consequences, these are true moral dilemmas for people in those positions – I do 
not wish to minimize that, nor to imply that there is no room for legitimate, informed and sincere 
differences of opinion about them.  Many dilemmas that spies confront involve very rare and very 
severe circumstances, and are the stuff of “intelligence ethics” a rarely discussed topic. xxv 
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But however you, or courts, adjudicate such moral dilemmas, there are profound effects on the 
personnel involved, on the agencies they work for, on national reputations and on networks of 
intelligence collaboration that are increasingly critical to counterintelligence and especially to 
counterterrorism.  Those effects are the topic of the next section, and the core of this paper. 
 
 
Impact on Intelligence Careers, Agencies, Liaison Relations and National Power 
 
Big lies that result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people have profound 
consequences that I will summarize bluntly here, then exemplify.  Participants emerge with 
damaged souls that eat their vitality and reduce their ability to perform legitimate intelligence 
functions forever after. Agencies that participate acquire reputations that repel ‘best and brightest’ 
potential employees, other nations and general publics.  Liaison relations are critical for complex, 
interdisciplinary and existential challenges of the 21st century.  No one wants to cooperate with 
psychopathic bullies, which is what spy institutions become when they abandon rule of law. 
 
People who commit torture always wound themselves as well, wound their nation’s reputation, 
and seldom get good intel anyway.  The best critique of torture I know was written by Ali Soufan, 
xxvi the FBI interrogator who actually got the best intelligence from key people like Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed from far more effective, and most importantly legal, rapport methods.  Then the CIA 
came in and started torturing their prisoner (183 times according to official CIA comment).  That 
was the end of useful intelligence from that suspect.  He cannot even be put on trial today because 
those who tortured him do not want him to testify in open court about how he was treated.  The 
claim to be just “obeying orders” invokes references to Nuremberg trials and fascist mentalities. 
 
Valerie Plame Wilson’s career was destroyed, and her family and sources abroad were put at risk 
for the rest of their lives.  That blunts collection, and recruitment of agents of any kind overseas.  
John Kiriakou’s career was destroyed too, and his pension, and his family was gravely damaged; 
he served 3 years in prison, and must pay for that felony conviction forever in loss of employment 
and rights to vote, etc.  Others resigned from the CIA prematurely in disgust, so the agency loses 
best and brightest people to be replaced by others with less conscience or less skill, probably both.  
The impact of memoirs cannot be measured, but it cannot be good for recruitment when good 
agents write bitter books with titles like “Imperial Hubris”xxvii “Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional 
Intelligence Culture”xxviii “Sleeping With the Devil”xxix and “Denial and Deception”xxx  This is 
very bad for any agency whose stock in trade is supposed to be “superior intelligence.”   
 
Press coverage gets less positive in a democracy when reporters are harassed for doing their jobs, 
like NY Times reporter James Risen. xxxi  Risen was threatened with jail for years trying to get 
him to testify against a CIA employee who dared reveal a small truth in Risen’s 2006 book “State 
of War” xxxii  This book is another good source of data and perspective on manipulation and 
outright abuse of intelligence to “sell” the invasion of Iraq.  Risen was threatened with harsh 
prosecution for revealing the secret that the government had lied to its own people.  Risen’s reply 
was to write a sequel called “Pay Any Price” which is a detailed expose about the costs of 
criminality in high office.  Books like his, and Frank Rich’s and James Bamford’s “Pretext for 
War” all erode the country’s reputation abroad, and reduce the quality of people seeking jobs at 
US secret agencies.  But they did not do the tortures, or invade innocent countries under false 
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pretenses, the USA did, with help from intelligence employees who chose career advancement 
over the Constitution. 
  
Corruption like this tends to spread to other professions, like medicine and psychology.  Torture 
teams often included doctors and psychologists, prompting responses such as when the American 
Psychological Association voted 157-1 to consider working for any US intelligence interrogation 
incompatible with their professional code of ethics on 7 August, 2015, and to prohibit members 
from doing so. xxxiii  The single dissenting vote was from a former government employee involved 
in the torture programs.  MD and bioethicist Steven Miles wrote a scathing review of the larger 
corruption of health professions that results called “Oath Betrayed.” xxxiv  All these things add up. 
 
The CIA’s former Station Chief in Italy is not the only US official or employee who can no 
longer travel abroad freely.  Robert Delahunty, an otherwise obscure coauthor of one of the more 
infamous memos that were used to rationalize torture as legal also cannot travel to Europe, at 
least, because he may be arrested if he does, and rendered to the World Court at The Hague for 
prosecution for crimes against humanity.  There are many more prominent former US officials 
who share this problem, like Vice President Dick Cheney in particular.  Many attorneys in the 
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, under Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
were employed to wordsmith around crystal clear international and US national laws prohibiting 
torture without any exceptions. xxxv  Delahunty’s special contribution was to conclude that US 
Presidents are not actually bound by ANY international laws when engaged in war.  If followed, 
this precedent would undermine centuries of trying to reduce the barbarity of war by rule of law.  
The reputation of government attorneys is damaged, as is the very concept of rule of law. xxxvi 
 
These derivative consequences all flowed from the original sin of starting an illegal and immoral 
war.  In the case if Iraq in 2003, that required distorting professional intelligence collection and 
analysis into mere propaganda.  And that depended on suppressing truth, even within the official 
intelligence community, and punishing anyone who dared to reveal the crimes, inside or out.  
These are fundamentally un-American activities, specifically proscribed by the US Constitution. 
 
One more case deserves special mention.  One U.S. Army intelligence private was so appalled by 
some of the things he saw, that he stole and released a number of documents in 2003 to Wikileaks 
and the world.  The most famous is known as “Collateral Damage” or “Collateral Murder.” xxxvii  
This is a video that shows two US helicopter gunships killing a dozen innocent people including 
two Reuter’s reporters, and injuring many others including two children in a car that came to help 
the victims.  The private’s name was Bradley Manning. xxxviii  He now lives in a military prison 
under sentence of 35 years for revealing classified information (a.k.a. a war crime in this case).  
Manning was recently punished for violating military prison rules, having in his possession some 
toothpaste past its ‘use by’ date, and a Vanity Fair magazine with Caitlyn Jenner on the cover. 
xxxix  His sentence for those transgressions was 21 days without privileges (like using the library, 
or one hour exercise every day) but he could have been sentenced to solitary confinement for life.  
Such is justice in America today, where you can get medals and money for murdering innocent 
people abroad, but can also get life in prison for telling American citizens the truth about that. 
 
 
A Brief Parallel with Israel’s IC before the Yom Kippur War of 1973 
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There are many other historic cases of serious intelligence failures, like the failure of the CIA to 
anticipate the explosion of a nuclear warhead by India in 1974, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 
1979, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into 15 states in 1991.  One common theme is 
something called “groupthink” which is not the same as deliberate politicization of assessments.  
These processes can interact.  Here is another example from a different country to exemplify the 
special dangers of groupthink, which is especially difficult in intelligence systems because of 
their closed information flows and tendency to confuse dissent with either ignorance or treason. 
 
Israel has some of the best intelligence agencies in the world, including the MOSSAD for foreign 
intelligence, Aman for military intelligence, and an agency for internal security that has gone by 
many names over recent decades (GSS, Shin Bet, SHABEK).  Surrounded by enemies and 
potential enemies, they have the best reasons to take intelligence very seriously.  Despite that, and 
despite an overwhelming victory against their neighbors in the 1967 war, Israel was surprised by 
an attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces in 1973 called the “Yom Kippur” War.  
 
Ephraim Kahana, in his “Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence” writes:  “The launching of 
the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 took Israel wholly by surprise and placed the country’s 
security—and even its survival—in jeopardy. … Much of the blame fell on the shoulders of the 
intelligence community, which was charged with not accurately assessing distinct information 
that Egypt and Syria planned to go to war on 6 October, 1973.” xl  In the final analysis, many 
conclude that such evidence existed but was rejected, either by intelligence personnel for early 
warning, or by political deciders, because they simply could not imagine actually being attacked 
by two countries that Israel had soundly defeated just six years before. 
 
Kahana’s work is dry history without moral judgments arranged as a dictionary.  It is a great 
resource, but a better window on the internal workings and psychology of MOSSAD is 
“Guideon’s Spies” by Gordon Thomas. xli  He reveals as few do how totally sincere and 
undoubtedly brilliant people can be confused by the pervasive secrecy of most intelligence 
organizations into missing obvious things, or reach stunningly inaccurate assessments, because 
the ability to check facts and correct errors is so constrained in secret power systems.  There are 
very few people allowed in the super-secret SCIFs (secure, compartmented information facilities).  
These chosen few tend to share the same assumptions, often share the same only partly accurate 
information, the bias toward secret rather than open information.  Political and bureaucratic 
pressures are also pervasive, and critics tend to be systematically excluded as “security risks” who 
might reveal the precious secrets.  So those who best detect bullshit are often excluded from the 
“cleared” crew, and phenomenal errors can occur.  Like not noticing you are about to be attacked 
by massed forces (Yom Kippur) or letting delusions of power overwhelm prudence so that you 
attack an innocent country for phony reasons (Iraq II).  The real reasons we attacked Iraq in 2003 
are almost never discussed publicly, but that is another long story. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
For a business filled with deceptions and betrayal, leavened by occasional dismemberment or 
death, professional national security intelligence is remarkably dependent on trust.  Sources trust 
their handlers or case officers with their lives in many cases, since to be revealed as a traitor to 
dictators often results in death, torture, sometimes torture and death to family members also.  
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Handlers and their agencies attend very carefully to how trustworthy sources are, because false or 
inaccurate information in life and death crises can have life or death consequences for thousands 
of people.  Policy people and other bosses want to trust their intelligence agencies and agents, 
because without professional intelligence support they may fail in terrible ways.  Yet all this trust 
must be negotiated among people who often lie for a living.  One Israeli scholar/practitioner put it 
thus:  “Even if expected to lie every day to the entire world, Israeli intelligence officers are 
expected to tell perfect, unvarnished truth to their superiors.” 
 
In the final analysis, every one of them is a human being, and all but a few started their careers 
with the best of intentions to do good for their countries at least.  But they also work in toxic 
environments that corrode such good intentions, both in the field and more important to this 
analysis, in bureaucracies that have been immersed in those toxic environments for decades. 
 
There is a special problem here that I can barely touch on in the space available.  Espionage often 
attracts psychopathic personalities. And at least some intelligence agencies specifically encourage 
those because “they make better spies” “if they can be controlled.” xlii  Some specialties like 
counterintelligence also attract disturbed personalities, and continuous use of some aspects of 
“tradecraft” actually induces mental illness in a large fraction of participants. xliii 
 
It is well established in social psychology that if you put ‘good people’ into a ‘bad system’ many 
of them can be induced to start acting very badly, very quickly. xliv  Systems matter, a lot, and 
organizational evil is often more difficult to deal with than individual evils. 
 
These are other, huge problems with official intelligence today.  What does the case of pre-war 
intelligence leading to the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 three provide for conclusions? 
 
1. A cabal of “neocons” and other vested interested was able to bring falsified intelligence 
directly to a U.S. President’s desk, and to maintain those falsehoods over months despite 
determined efforts by some others in the official American IC to show they were wrong. 
 
2. This “success” was only possible because of relentless suppression of dissenting views 
within those 17 agencies, and compliance with the party line by employees who chose 
loyalty to their agency and security clearance contracts over their oaths to protect and 
defend the U.S. Constitution.  This was compounded by subsequent suppression of 
reporters who tried to provide safe ways for insiders to reveal what they knew to the 
public which, in theory, is the ultimate source of political legitimacy in the U.S.A. 
 
3. Actual official oversight of US intelligence is pathetically weak, despite endless 
proclamations to the contrary. 
 
4. Potential Solutions include: 
 
a. A thorough overhaul of the bloated classification system, which everyone knows is 
obscenely obese, covers embarrassing mistakes more than legitimate national 
security secrets, costs a fortune to administer, and slows down legitimate analysis.  
A thorough review of how and why to do this called the Moynihan Report of 1996 
sits in government libraries ready for implementation. xlv 
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b. Reform of the recruitment and training programs to account for the fact (which 
will not change) that espionage attracts psychopathic personalities, who bring 
some advantages due to their indifference to normal ethics and exceptional skills at 
lying and manipulating people.  Once in, they tend to rise fast and to change the 
bureaucratic rules of admission to reinforce those advantages and to keep potential 
critics out. 
 
c. Real “Whistleblower Protection” legislation could help a lot.  Such protection 
exists for most federal employees in America, but intelligence personnel are 
specifically exempted.  Thus when ethical insiders with moral courage dare to stick 
their necks out, those are cut off as they are promptly prosecuted, often silenced by 
prison terms, and always lose their careers since security clearances are yanked.  
Over time, this reduces the moral character of the agency which “cleanses itself” of 
moral thought.  That reduces the accuracy of analysis, the probity of policy, the 
wisdom of politicians and the courage of real warriors dedicated to protection of 
the innocent for all. 
 
The end state of this degenerative process is commonly called the “police-state.”  One exceptional 
description of that is found in a movie rather than scientific literature, produced in 2006, called 
“The Lives of Others” or in original “Der Leben das Anderen.”  This film received the Academy 
Award of 2006 for best foreign film. xlvi  It describes living conditions in the old East Germany, 
where the internal security service called the “Stasi” more or less forced one-tenth of the 
population to spy on the rest of the population, and everyone was suspect of disloyalty including 
rivals in the security bureaucracies themselves.  Once you let your security services become 
dominated by paranoid psychopathic personalities (like James Jesus Angleton, for another historic 
example) you are liable to inherit a “Legacy of Ashes” as described by New York Times reporter 
Tim Weiner. xlvii, xlviii 
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